The bad political situation in Mexico was not written 'by the finger of God', things might have been different factual Against
Was it inevitable that, as a national society, the Mexicans we met where we are today: politically polarized and unable to reach agreement on key issues and where time lost means a great cost? This lack of agreement on the fundamental need to restructure Mexico's public life.
Some professionals in the field say that historical events should be analyzed as they occurred and now. Well, that's a position, but there is another: one that considers the historical processes that nothing is really predetermined by what he wrote "The Finger of God." Examples
is clear that all social reality is framed by situations that were generated some time ago and that are impossible or difficult to modify. Here is an example. When the end of the colonial period it became clear that the New Spain was threatened American expansionist impulses, it was concluded that the best defense was to populate the vast Septentrion quickly and people loyal to the central government and Catholic cultural roots, that is, antagonistic to whites. However, from 1821 a Mexico was not yet a nation, with just 6 million souls concentrated in the center of a territory of about 4 million km2 could hardly succeed in efforts to settle on time and with the appropriate density, the uninhabited north. Therefore, even if that fateful April 21, 1836 one thousand five hundred men under the command of Santa Anna had not been tended to sleep without sentinels on the banks of the San Jacinto River and had successfully resisted the assault of the 800 men of Sam Houston, U.S. determination to expand at the expense of Mexico's territory could hardly have been missed. Sooner or later the two countries have clashed increasingly unequal and what happened in 1836 or 1846 to 1848, there occurred another way but with a very similar result. The outcome was overdetermined.
A different case
aided the interpretation of the fall of the government of Francisco I. Madero in 1913 emphasizes the errors of the President to disarm irregular troops and hoped to defend the new regime to a federal army that was making the past. The military coup against the nascent democracy in 1913, he says, was inevitable and Madero effort was doomed to failure, as was shown by the facts of the "Ten Tragic Days" in February of that year. However, it is worth considering, for example, the hypothesis of a biographer of Madero, Stanley R. Ross, developed in Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1959). Here it is argued that by 1913 Madero had passed the worst obstacles to his government: the army had suppressed the rebellion of Félix Díaz and had not heeded the calls of Bernardo Reyes to second in his rebellion. Again, the Army had defeated federal northern former Pascual Orozco and Madero had cornered the Zapatistas in Morelos. The possibilities of strengthening the government of Madero to a good relationship with Washington increased with the victory of Woodrow Wilson in the United States, a victory that sealed the end of the mission of a terrible enemy of Madero, the ambassador to Mexico Henry Lane Wilson. The rebellion that broke out on February 9, 1913 in Mexico City ruled in the beginning: the rebel General Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz was killed, besieged in the citadel, had fallen to a well-planned assault. However, the assault never took place because of a casualty: the general who thwarted the attempt of the rebels, Lauro Villar, was wounded and Madero appointed new commander of the place to someone who had no command of troops, but that was in the right place at the wrong time to destinations in Mexico: General Victoriano Huerta, the very embodiment of villainy. If the general had not been injured Villar-fact-and most likely would have gone to the front of the loyal troops and reinforcements such as those provided shortly after Gen. Felipe Angeles, could end up with Felix Diaz and under these conditions, the attempted coup failed had strengthened Madero. Thus, the bullet that struck the general reactionary Villar and fury that were behind of the man who shot caused a huge effect on the political history of Mexico in the twentieth century, it finally made from the ashes of moderate maderismo something unforeseen arises: a real revolution.
And what we have today was really inevitable?
Obviously it was very difficult, if not impossible, to avoid that at the beginning of last century, the United States ripped Mexico half its territory. However, the fall of Madero was not subject to a similar predetermination, it was inevitable that the country had to have gone the way of a great civil war.
An analysis similar to what happened in 1913 can be done today on what that has happened in politics in Mexico since 2000. The authoritarian regime established since the triumph of the Mexican Revolution was already anachronistic when the wave of democratization swept through Latin America in 1980. I had to stop. However, what has happened from 2000 to date does not necessarily must have happened, ie the establishment of political democracy in Mexico could have run better channels and maybe we would not have to waste time and energy to find how to correct Current reality: unable to lead a transition to democratic consolidation and, in turn, has resulted in an unfavorable environment to generate and drive the momentum of the society towards economic growth, rule of law and the design of a genuine national project.
have acted as a statesman, Vicente Fox could very well have channeled their enormous legitimacy and citizens' optimism and desire for change toward dismantling the old regime, corrupt unions confront, dismantle monopolies, to capture the "big fish" the past and prosecute, punish violations of human rights, invest oil surpluses productively, etc.-to the point of leaving the PRI as the past and not to the possibility of returning. A good political leadership of the PAN could have done that citizens feel really identified with democracy and not, like today, where only 42 percent of Mexicans consider it the preferred form of government (data Latinobarómetro 2009). Only in Guatemala have a more negative situation in this field. The
the 2006 election could have faced without the constant interference of the President in favor of a candidate. Could also face without having to qualify a "danger to Mexico" to the leftist opposition, with IFE had not been openly set up "mode" of the PRI and the PAN and a genuinely impartial TEPJF. Finally, the choice could have been done without open and illegal action by business leaders in the race. If in 2006 the rules for an election dominated by the democratic spirit had been observed, the government of Felipe Calderon would not have legitimized the urgent need, as you have suggested Rubén Aguilar and Jorge G. Castañeda, through military mobilization against drug cartels and that war would not have had to run today runs the risk of failure.
A well-run election in 2006 would have allowed immediately after a grand bargain among all political actors. A negotiation indispensable for realizing the reform of state recently proposed Felipe Calderón and to carry out the true tax reform, an immediate program of job creation, to agree the core elements of a viable business model long term, dismantle monopolies, return the public safety, take effective measures to protect the environment or and paper and decide to play and defend principles abroad. Conclusion
The list of what could be and was not is long, but the important thing is to recognize that the current national conditions were not inevitable: were the result of actions for which those responsible have names and surnames. We have to conclude that Mexico is not a victim of bad luck and that things can be done differently.
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