Thursday, November 26, 2009

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Elections and the embassy

The 1946 elections may serve to examine what role the "American factor" in our political processes

Hypothesis

The normal Mexico is now heavily involved in the crisis made -económica, política, jurídica, moral- y tratando de sobrevivir. En contraste, el México político vive en otra dimensión: la del proceso electoral del 2012. Por tanto, es un buen momento para discutir un asunto viejo: ¿cuál y cuánta es la influencia de la superpotencia del norte en nuestras elecciones? Aquí se sostiene esta hipótesis: por acción u omisión el "factor norteamericano" es una variable que siempre entra en este juego aunque raras veces es la determinante. México es ya un sistema demasiado complejo como para ser manipulado desde fuera con facilidad y, además, casi siempre Estados Unidos ha tenido en su agenda otras intervenciones más urgentes.

A partir de la U.S. intervention in the fall of the governments of Francisco I. Madero, Victoriano Huerta in 1913-1914 has been often said that this or that candidate did or did not come to power by the will of the United States. To check this assumption and replace it with something better mere opinions, it is useful to review some important choices as the 1946 with the support of files in this case, the National Archives in Washington, State Department (ANW).

The starting point

Major powers are also wrong. In 1945 the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, George S. Messersmith, left a fair assessment: the presidential succession to door was to mark a long time future of Mexico (ANW, 812.00/1-1246 and 812.00/2-2645, January 12 and February 26, 1945). Which was not so successful was to insist that the crux of this election was the confrontation between right and left, between the forces seeking to cooperate with the United States and the nationalists who objected to such collaboration. For the diplomat, former President Lazaro Cardenas and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the union leader, were the heads of those left-wing nationalist forces were bent on ending high-Mexico partnership, established in the heat of World War II.

Although the concept of Cold War had not yet been coined, that would make Bernard Baruch in 1947 - its essence, the global clash between the U.S. and the USSR was already operating and painted the view that the U.S. government to judge its relationship with the Mexican political process. From this perspective, the former President Cardenas became an obstacle to progress in Mexico and that country's relationship with its northern neighbor. And the problem was not only Cardenas but also many other items embedded in the government, the ambassador was referring to people like Eduardo Suarez, secretary of the Treasury or Ramon Beteta, just waiting the right moment to "give a stab in the back" (ANW, 812.002/1-845 and 812.00/1-1246, 8 and 12 January 1945).

Candidate
embassy
For the ambassador, in the present circumstances, the ideal person to take over the destinies of Mexico's Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla was "honest and good attitudes" and architect of the relationship harmonious hitherto been the United States and Mexico. However, this is an important point, the ambassador agreed that although he was much in its outcome, the United States was not convenient to jump right in the complex Mexican and could not even give the appearance of having preferences because that would ammunition to the enemies of his candidate and accused him of traitorous (ANW, 812.00/6-1445, June 14, 1945).


system
Washington officially regarded Mexico as a democracy, but always assumed that the elections would be neither free nor fair. In Mexico there was already a democratic spirit but not the institutions to make it happen and why not to tell who would win the vote but the official machinery (ANW, 812.00/1-1246 and 4-2646, 12 January and 26 April 812.00/3-3046 1945, 4-246, 7-146, 7-246 and 7-336, March 30, April 2 and 1, 2 and 3 July 1946). And finally, in Mexico, "the concept of free elections was on."

Those who did not want the embassy

for U.S. diplomats the worst case scenario was that the PRM candidate appointed General Miguel Henriquez Guzman, it was the letter from Cardenas (ANW, 812.00/3-445, March 4, 1945). When Henriquez, after his interviews with Avila Camacho gave up his presidential pretensions, the embassy breathed easier, but not for long, because he is extremely annoyed that Avila Camacho would have been "forced" to accept the Secretary of the Interior, Michael German, as the official candidate. Messersmith was the worst of the views of German, not only was corrupt, with possible sympathies for the Axis during the war but was "weak character" and could be left influenced by his supporters, and among them were Cárdenas, Lombardo, the CTM and the Communist Party (ANW, 812.00/1-1246, January 12, 1945). In contrast, Padilla was the key to continuing the good relationship by being a moderate and have the strength of character to sustain his conviction regarding the need to maintain a good relationship with the USA (ANW, 812.00/9-2745, 4 October, 1945).

Seeking support from Washington

German Michael soon realized that to secure the presidency he should not be taken the American veto, which had to earn at least the neutrality of Washington. In March 1945, German asked directly an American Embassy official to which presidential candidate would support Washington in Mexico. This question forced the embassy to ensure that America is not going to get to anything in this case (ANW, 812.00/3-1645, March 16, 1945). Unsatisfied, in August, German decided to take the bull by the horns and twice requested an interview with Messersmith "in a discreet place." By then, German had already publicly declared their support and commitment to the Good Neighbor policy. Washington finally agreed that while the ambassador was away, will meet with German Guy W. Ray, first secretary at the embassy. The memorandum of that conversation is waste.

The candidate assured the U.S. that, and as President, would maintain the policy of cooperation with the U.S. and, eventually, is going to get rid of Lombardo had to keep some influence in his administration. At year end, Ray had another interview with an "informant" close to German and Ramon Beteta. On that occasion, the envoy sought to assure the U.S. was already under way in the fight against the Germans left, and Ramon Beteta, although he had served in the cabinet de Cardenas, with German defender would policy proximity to Washington (ANW, 812.00/11-345, November 3 1945).

In 1946, on the eve of elections, Padilla decided to also play your letter from the Embassy and, after making anti-communist statements, the U.S. sought to decide to take sides even if indirectly. To this did an interview with the ambassador, but it was not his friend but a newcomer Messersmith: Walter Thurston. That Padilla was defined himself as a Democrat, a pro-American and anti-communist and, in turn, asked the U.S. government to let him know Ávila Camacho not tolerate election fraud presidential succession decided, as an election German fraudulent could impose lead to a popular uprising and if, despite this, the United States insisted on recognizing his rival, then destroy in Mexico pro-American sentiment that was born during the war (and he, Padilla, had encouraged). Thurston heard but would not commit to anything (ANW, 812.00/6-1946, June 19, 1946). Desa-nately for Padilla, by then, and without having worn with open surgery, Washington and was then a German in his pocket. What happened subsequently complied fully shows that German, as president, what once promised to Messersmith. Conclusion



The ideology of the powerful distorted vision of the Mexican reality and Washington that Mexico failed to adopt their point of view. American direct intervention in the electoral process was minimal but its great weight in Mexico had a significant impact. Finally, the process showed that Mexican nationalism itself contained in something the United States and that the best of this nationalism was on the left, not right.

Friday, November 20, 2009

Kodicom Kmc-4400r Problema

Mexico: committed suicide or suicide?

In Mexico, power has rarely been in the hands of those who should. And certainly not the case today

Farewell to Don Genaro Gongora Pimentel. Their presence in the SCJN was an exception that proves the rule. Approach



Emir Sader, secretary general of the Latin American Social Sciences Council (CLACSO), gave an interview in Spain, where he summarized the policy of Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, who, despite the global economic crisis, managed to reduce inequality and strengthening social national identity because "[a] ument microcredit, kept wages above inflation, promoted formal employment, diversified international trade and reinforced the interregional." Mexico, Sader said he followed a road and "in my opinion, has committed suicide."

The Mexican route to suicide, according to Sadr, began with a free trade agreement that led to a extreme dependence on U.S. trade in your league over the International Monetary Fund (institution to which Brazil is not only borrows pays), the "serious" corruption and, finally, a climate of extreme violence (International Public, 13 November).

A

assisted suicide are people and countries that, at certain moments, appear to commit suicide. The most dramatic modern example is Germany. At the end of a brutal world war waged by nationalist politics and aggressive in the extreme, the German people obeyed the irrational order of their Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, to resist the enemy, although there was no hope of success. Examination of the causes that led the Germans to pursue this dead end really shows that countries do not commit suicide, but that "suicide" a crazy or irresponsible leaderships or extremely stupid or selfish or corrupt or all of these together . They are the leaders who have a society bound by its institutional structure to a disaster situation, and in the specific case of Mexico, the loss of historical time, opportunities and collective energy.

The disaster in a nutshell

Resistance to change in depth when there was still time, back in 1960-just when the dominant political and economic models began to show its limitations, and the mediocrity of leadership made under Luis Echeverría and José López Portillo authoritarianism stubbornly dysfunctional practices until the balance of payments and external debt amount melted down the country. Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas substantially changed the economic model but not political. Extreme neoliberalism embraced and made to pay the cost of changing the working classes, to small and medium industries and the middle class. That neoliberalism was introduced without its counterpart: the real competition (and fair) in political or economic. The result was the illusion to suppose that the neoliberal and authoritarian Mexico and had entered the first world.

In 2000, the PRI was forced to drop the presidency, but remained in control of most states and municipalities. Driving the process was taken over by a PAN he shared with the PRI's neoliberal vision of the economy and he had already learned to negotiate since 1989. The PAN took a blink of eyes to get accustomed to power, but neither wanted nor knew how to use its initial legitimacy to advance this fundamental change that was committed as a champion of democracy. He feared that the left could move the enjoyment of power, his honors and income and claiming the existence of "a danger to Mexico" pact with the PRI-negotiated with the past, and reaffirmed the failed course for which he was the country.

faded So assuming historical change nine years ago. Today, and according to surveys like the one just to lift the CIDE (La Jornada, 16 November), the 2000 does not seem to be anything other than the beginning of a simple two six-year interlude in which the PAN lost its innocence and the PRI was recycled to try to return on track with a touch of legitimacy "democratic" she needed to take hold better in their "second time", which, if we do nothing, you can start in 2012.

indicator 'Forbes' magazine U.S.

periodically select the world's richest people has just opened another list: of the 67 most powerful people in the world, based on four indicators: the number of persons for influencing their ability to project power beyond its immediate scope their access to resources and the intensity with which they exercise that power (Reforma, 12 November). Well, on that list are present a couple of Mexicans who were listed among the wealthiest in the world: Carlos Slim (sixth place) and the drug lord Joaquin Guzman Loera, alias "El Chapo" (in the cuarentaiunavo place.)

Forbes The distinction awarded to the Mexican couple says a lot about both but says much more about the nature of society and political system on which Slim and Guzman Loera have assembled an impressive fortune and power. And this is more evident when comparing the other names on the list. The first three are political superpowers: Barack Obama, Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin, the fourth, a technocrat, Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve power, the United States, only two other figures who share the fifth place are entrepreneurs Sergey Brin and Larry Page, makers of the powerful Google search engine.

Forbes does not consider any powerful Mexican politician and that is absolutely right. Influential Mexicans are really only two businesses: one dominates in the legal economy and the other illegal. The remarkable thing is that in Mexico the political power and not a source of great power in the sense Forbes but an anemic economy, which for 27 years does not raise his head, has served to raise wealth and power as the world Slim concentrating. For Forbes's explanation is that Slim dominates 90 percent of the fixed and mobile telephony in Mexico. This low concentration of competitive telecommunications market in Mexico has its origin in a more political than economic: the terms in which Carlos Salinas privatized Telefonos de Mexico in favor of Slim, and that this base has been able to penetrate successfully in other economic areas and in other countries. Anyway, there are few people today associate the lack of dynamism of the Mexican economy to the presence of monopolistic forces such as Slim. Here we have an explanatory element of "suicide" Sader speaking Mexican.

violence of organized crime and the state is another feature that the secretary of Clacso associated with Mexican failure. And that's where it appears Joaquin Guzman Loera. For El Chapo, Mexico's economy is a secondary factor, as its major market is north of Rio Bravo, fueled by an economy capable of sustaining without any problems prohibited substance in an amount at prices retail, it was estimated earlier this century in 60 billion dollars (The Economist, July 28, 2001). The power base of the Sinaloa drug lord is not a distortion of the Mexican economic system but of the justice system, especially its law enforcement structures and security agencies, but not just there, for the unwillingness of the authorities to attack circuits of drug money is also part of the problem. The root of the power of El Chapo is the enormous corruption of the government of Mexico. Other Indicator



One of the most notorious members of the current political elite, the lawyer and former presidential candidate of PAN, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, has just destroyed part of a Nogalera with copies of more than 100 years old, owned by a poor family in the town of Apaseo el Alto, Guanajuato, to move without permission from the appropriate authority, the trees to hacienda "La Barranca" to make the environment more pleasant in that his farm of 480 acres with a house of 21 bedrooms, El Universal, 13 and 14 November). In contrast, we have Jesus Leon Santos, an indigenous farmer in the Mixteca Alta which for years has organized his countrymen to rescue traditional techniques and through tequio the ecology of the area planted 4 million trees and therefore, won the prestigious Goldman Prize 2008, but no internal recognition ( www.goldmanprize.org ). Conclusion



not turning back: the "suicide" of Mexico is closely related to real power structures, which are not even remotely the interests of the majority, the interests of the nation.