The 1946 elections may serve to examine what role the "American factor" in our political processes
Hypothesis
The normal Mexico is now heavily involved in the crisis made -económica, política, jurídica, moral- y tratando de sobrevivir. En contraste, el México político vive en otra dimensión: la del proceso electoral del 2012. Por tanto, es un buen momento para discutir un asunto viejo: ¿cuál y cuánta es la influencia de la superpotencia del norte en nuestras elecciones? Aquí se sostiene esta hipótesis: por acción u omisión el "factor norteamericano" es una variable que siempre entra en este juego aunque raras veces es la determinante. México es ya un sistema demasiado complejo como para ser manipulado desde fuera con facilidad y, además, casi siempre Estados Unidos ha tenido en su agenda otras intervenciones más urgentes.
A partir de la U.S. intervention in the fall of the governments of Francisco I. Madero, Victoriano Huerta in 1913-1914 has been often said that this or that candidate did or did not come to power by the will of the United States. To check this assumption and replace it with something better mere opinions, it is useful to review some important choices as the 1946 with the support of files in this case, the National Archives in Washington, State Department (ANW).
The starting point
Major powers are also wrong. In 1945 the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, George S. Messersmith, left a fair assessment: the presidential succession to door was to mark a long time future of Mexico (ANW, 812.00/1-1246 and 812.00/2-2645, January 12 and February 26, 1945). Which was not so successful was to insist that the crux of this election was the confrontation between right and left, between the forces seeking to cooperate with the United States and the nationalists who objected to such collaboration. For the diplomat, former President Lazaro Cardenas and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the union leader, were the heads of those left-wing nationalist forces were bent on ending high-Mexico partnership, established in the heat of World War II.
Although the concept of Cold War had not yet been coined, that would make Bernard Baruch in 1947 - its essence, the global clash between the U.S. and the USSR was already operating and painted the view that the U.S. government to judge its relationship with the Mexican political process. From this perspective, the former President Cardenas became an obstacle to progress in Mexico and that country's relationship with its northern neighbor. And the problem was not only Cardenas but also many other items embedded in the government, the ambassador was referring to people like Eduardo Suarez, secretary of the Treasury or Ramon Beteta, just waiting the right moment to "give a stab in the back" (ANW, 812.002/1-845 and 812.00/1-1246, 8 and 12 January 1945).
Candidate
embassy
For the ambassador, in the present circumstances, the ideal person to take over the destinies of Mexico's Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla was "honest and good attitudes" and architect of the relationship harmonious hitherto been the United States and Mexico. However, this is an important point, the ambassador agreed that although he was much in its outcome, the United States was not convenient to jump right in the complex Mexican and could not even give the appearance of having preferences because that would ammunition to the enemies of his candidate and accused him of traitorous (ANW, 812.00/6-1445, June 14, 1945).
system
Washington officially regarded Mexico as a democracy, but always assumed that the elections would be neither free nor fair. In Mexico there was already a democratic spirit but not the institutions to make it happen and why not to tell who would win the vote but the official machinery (ANW, 812.00/1-1246 and 4-2646, 12 January and 26 April 812.00/3-3046 1945, 4-246, 7-146, 7-246 and 7-336, March 30, April 2 and 1, 2 and 3 July 1946). And finally, in Mexico, "the concept of free elections was on."
Those who did not want the embassy
for U.S. diplomats the worst case scenario was that the PRM candidate appointed General Miguel Henriquez Guzman, it was the letter from Cardenas (ANW, 812.00/3-445, March 4, 1945). When Henriquez, after his interviews with Avila Camacho gave up his presidential pretensions, the embassy breathed easier, but not for long, because he is extremely annoyed that Avila Camacho would have been "forced" to accept the Secretary of the Interior, Michael German, as the official candidate. Messersmith was the worst of the views of German, not only was corrupt, with possible sympathies for the Axis during the war but was "weak character" and could be left influenced by his supporters, and among them were Cárdenas, Lombardo, the CTM and the Communist Party (ANW, 812.00/1-1246, January 12, 1945). In contrast, Padilla was the key to continuing the good relationship by being a moderate and have the strength of character to sustain his conviction regarding the need to maintain a good relationship with the USA (ANW, 812.00/9-2745, 4 October, 1945).
Seeking support from Washington
German Michael soon realized that to secure the presidency he should not be taken the American veto, which had to earn at least the neutrality of Washington. In March 1945, German asked directly an American Embassy official to which presidential candidate would support Washington in Mexico. This question forced the embassy to ensure that America is not going to get to anything in this case (ANW, 812.00/3-1645, March 16, 1945). Unsatisfied, in August, German decided to take the bull by the horns and twice requested an interview with Messersmith "in a discreet place." By then, German had already publicly declared their support and commitment to the Good Neighbor policy. Washington finally agreed that while the ambassador was away, will meet with German Guy W. Ray, first secretary at the embassy. The memorandum of that conversation is waste.
The candidate assured the U.S. that, and as President, would maintain the policy of cooperation with the U.S. and, eventually, is going to get rid of Lombardo had to keep some influence in his administration. At year end, Ray had another interview with an "informant" close to German and Ramon Beteta. On that occasion, the envoy sought to assure the U.S. was already under way in the fight against the Germans left, and Ramon Beteta, although he had served in the cabinet de Cardenas, with German defender would policy proximity to Washington (ANW, 812.00/11-345, November 3 1945).
In 1946, on the eve of elections, Padilla decided to also play your letter from the Embassy and, after making anti-communist statements, the U.S. sought to decide to take sides even if indirectly. To this did an interview with the ambassador, but it was not his friend but a newcomer Messersmith: Walter Thurston. That Padilla was defined himself as a Democrat, a pro-American and anti-communist and, in turn, asked the U.S. government to let him know Ávila Camacho not tolerate election fraud presidential succession decided, as an election German fraudulent could impose lead to a popular uprising and if, despite this, the United States insisted on recognizing his rival, then destroy in Mexico pro-American sentiment that was born during the war (and he, Padilla, had encouraged). Thurston heard but would not commit to anything (ANW, 812.00/6-1946, June 19, 1946). Desa-nately for Padilla, by then, and without having worn with open surgery, Washington and was then a German in his pocket. What happened subsequently complied fully shows that German, as president, what once promised to Messersmith. Conclusion
The ideology of the powerful distorted vision of the Mexican reality and Washington that Mexico failed to adopt their point of view. American direct intervention in the electoral process was minimal but its great weight in Mexico had a significant impact. Finally, the process showed that Mexican nationalism itself contained in something the United States and that the best of this nationalism was on the left, not right.
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