It would be nice to start discussing the usefulness of continuing or changing the direction of the current drug war. Priorities
Since December 2006 the Mexican government has insisted the military in a war against drug trafficking but it is time to ask: does it make sense to continue it with the same intensity and direction? Only six years so far, and until the middle of last month, casualties related to organized crime accounted for about 14 thousand (El Universal, Sept. 11).
Arguably, it should raise or redefine the "war on drugs" because the dead and many, limited resources and there are more urgent and legitimate alternative to reverse the collective effort that is now used against the drug cartels. First, it is better engage the country in a war against poverty fund or the poor quality of its education system, or back sheet, could do with a battle against unemployment, against environmental destruction and even to transform the growing informal economy into the official. It would be really popular a genuine national crusade against public corruption and insecurity, that is, crime that affects the ordinary citizen, and that there is drug trafficking. In addition, possible war fronts are not lacking, which are scarce resources and the will to carry them out. Therefore we must take care of priorities, because maybe in the battle against drug cartels we're in a conflict that is entirely or even genuinely ours and, worse, one where it is not possible a real victory effective. The essence
successfully fought a real war means that society must be willing to bear to bring in maximum stress all its social and institutional relationships. That kind of war would mean that the country's leadership had developed a plan with a clear idea of \u200b\u200bmeans and goals, determine exactly who is the adversary and why and what are the chances of defeat. For its part, society should accept a high degree of responsibility, personal and collective sacrifice, and commitment to one of the largest companies can impose on a community. In short, put one in a war is a decision that must be capitalized and made with full awareness and responsibility.
The drug group as the great enemy
In principle there is no doubt that Mexico as a country would be better against oneself and the world if the Family, the Gulf Cartel, the Juarez Cartel and the rest of the drug trafficking organizations were already history. However, specialists in the field and own common sense tells us that as long as external sources of demand and, therefore, financing, especially if that source is the most powerful country in the world, the struggle against the Mexican drug trade have the same weakness that occurs, for example, when an army combat armed groups that have their main source of supply and support in another country. United States, with the help of NATO can not defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan just because it can find shelter and resources in Pakistan. For Mexico, the external factor in their efforts to eliminate organized drug trafficking is a major obstacle, as their ability to press and force Washington to act is infinitely more limited than Washington to pressure Islamabad.
The Mérida Initiative is that the Mexican government made a major historical commitment of the U.S. government to really act against demand and against the supply of arms and transfer money to Mexican criminal groups. However, for historical or political reasons the U.S. authorities can not prevent its citizens from acquiring weapons and some of them, transferred to Mexican drug cartels. Reviewing budget items, according to a paper by Eric Olson and Robert Donnelly, that, so far, the two-thirds of the amount the U.S. government invests in the fight against drugs are designed to combat the supply and only third to face the very source of evil: the demand ("Confronting the Challenges of Organized Crime in Mexico and Latin America", 2009, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC). Logic
Felipe Calderon launched the army to war against drug traffickers as part of a move to several bands. As in many other stratagems, one of its core objectives-perhaps-seems to have been to create a situation which caused the public to stand on the side of the "strong leader" and determined. And in that sense the move seems to have borne fruit, since 83 percent of Mexicans support the use of military against the drug cartels (Pew Center poll, published on September 27.) However, to Olson and Donnelly, as for many other specialists, the fact that "rarely has a victory been possible in this type of war, especially when the demand for illegal products is high. "
The alternative could be, experts say, simply use the army to selectively limit the influence of organized crime, increase the cost of business which operates as in other fields less violent and spectacular but more effective: to prevent money laundering, reform or recreate new institutional framework, police, prosecutors, courts-educate or re-educate potential consumers and, above all, make activity of the Mexican authorities is conditional on U.S. progress in effective control of arms, movements of money and a real low demand for drugs in their society. Possibility
A German researcher, a specialist in economic factors in the negotiation of conflicts within states, Achim Wennmann has suggested exploring the possibility that the government of Mexico enter into negotiations with the cartels using formal intermediaries and targeted clear: limit the areas of activity of the cartels, not to operate in schools, not to extend its activities to other classes such as kidnapping, trafficking, etc., and limit violence. What is needed is to give economic incentives for the cartels to limit their activities and spaces and enable a life of Mexican society closer to civility.
In principle, negotiate with organized crime is a morally repugnant idea. However, it has an ethical side defensible: a war without victory possible is an indefinite extension of the slaughter and brutality. Mexican society, in particular young people with no chance of social mobility just getting used to see violence as normal and extremely effective. The callus of the collective consciousness means a huge cultural cost, a mortgage the future. Mexico does not have to pay a bill that should be entirely in the hands of consumers, who ultimately is what makes possible the mountains of Sinaloa has become not only a producer of marijuana and poppy but totally dehumanized characters being imposed lifestyles, values \u200b\u200band extreme forms of relationships between organized crime and the rest of society. Italy is an example of how difficult it is to uproot the culture of the mafia. Barriers
Negotiate with criminal organizations is not an ideal solution but the alternative is worse. However, the obstacles to achieving a less bad among potential are many. On the one hand, the "war on drugs" has paid dividends to Calderon and he does not have many alternative sources of political capital. On the other hand, Washington would have no objection, and while this government has not been able to reduce the demand for his company has ample resources to pressure Mexico. There is ironic that Washington itself might consider negotiating with bad-for example, negotiating with one of its enemies to isolate Taliban to more intransigent.
However, as a society have the right and obligation to propose alternatives to a state of things simply deteriorate over time. Mexico is better and more urgent things to do with their economic resources, with the lives of young people, their soldiers and policemen, have to fight a war without hope and, finally, is only partly and in any case our product of our proximity to the United States.
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